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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND BUDGETARY PATTERNS 
IN SELECTED MIDDLE EASTERN AND 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: AN ASSESSMENT 
Robert E. Looney and Peter C. Frederiksen* 
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the relationship between defense spending 
and budgetary allocations to various programs for twelve Middle Eastern and 
North African/Mediterranean countries in an attempt to see if spending patterns 
vary systematically with changes (both anticipated and unanticipated) in the 
budget deficit or defense expenditures. Detailed results are presented for Syria 
and Oman although general patterns are discussed for all countries. Not 
surprisingly, we found that budget tradeoffs are complex and reflect different 
priorities across countries. Increases in deficits can either offset or reinforce 
changes in defense spending. Defense and socio-economic tradeoffs vary 
considerably depending on whether the country spends relatively a lot or little 
on defense. We conclude that there are probably some long-run costs associated 
with sample countries cutting growth intensive programs to accommodate 
defense. 
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and Looney have co-authored over thirty articles on economic development and 
the role played by defense and infrastructure expenditures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Kuwait conflict, defense spending in many 
Middle East and Mediterranean countries is likely to grow despite serious 
fiscal problems and urgent social and economic difficulties. Depending 
on its relative impact, reallocations of resources to defense may 
significantly affect economic performance and democratization efforts in 
these countries. The purpose of this study is to examine the historical 
relationship between defense spending and budgetary allocations in 
twelve Middle Eastern and North African/Mediterranean countries: 
Malta, Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Bahrain, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Oman. 
Many of these countries have recently been forced to introduce 
austerity programs. Despite its importance, little is known how these 
governments set priorities between major expenditure categories as 
revenues shrink. For example, do expenditures on certain programs vary 
systematically with changes (both anticipated and unanticipated) in the 
budgetary deficit or defense expenditures? If such a relationship exists, 
is there any consistency between which sectors gained and which sectors 
lost? Do expenditure patterns provide insight as to the manner in which 
various governments established budgetary priorities? 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
At first glance, bQdgetary tradeoffs between defense on the one 
hand and socio/economic programs on the other hand seems fairly 
straightforward: increases in military expenditures, ceteris paribus, will 
crowd out an equivalent amount in other programs according to their 
proportion of the total. Recent research has shown that this view of the 
budgetary process is simplistic and does not conform to how 
governments choose to prioritize expenditures (see Deger, 1985). A 
significant issue for many Middle East countries which face austerity 
programs is that anecdotal evidence suggest that officials often follow ad 
hoc rules for cutting programs -- cutting new programs rather than 
ongoing projects, favoring Ministries which are politically powerful. or 
reducing programs which have expanded most rapidly in the past for 
example (Caiden & Wildavsky, 1974). With regard to which sectors get 
cut back, it is often felt that some programs are relatively more 
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vulnerable. The defense sector is usually considered to be well protected 
while social sectors (health, education, rural development, etc.) are 
considered vulnerable. This alleged vulnerability of the social sector in 
developing countries is evident in several World Banlc publications (see 
World Banlc, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, and 1984). 
Much of the recent literature has tried to quantify the tradeoffs 
between defense, education, and health -- typically the three largest 
programs. Heller and Cheasty (1983) examined 27 middle-income 
countries to see how education expenditures changed when budgets were 
cut between 1965 and 1978. Expecting to find that education was fairly 
elastic, instead they found a certain 'resilience' in education 
expenditures. Hicks and Kubisch (1983) isolated 32 countries where real 
government expenditures had declined in more than one year between 
1972 and 1980. They compared real percentage changes for each sector 
and for total government expenditures and found that social sectors and 
defense were relatively protected -- declining by 5 % and 8 % respectively 
while government expenditures declined by 13 % . 
Using a simultaneous equation model, Deger (1985) estimated that 
if defense allocations were cut by 15 % , education would increase by 
approximately 1.9% in her sample of 50 countries. Examining data for 
Venezuela between 1950 and 1983, Looney (1986a) concluded that 
defense expenditures were reduced far less than comparative declines in 
overall government expenditures. In another study which included other 
Latin American countries, Looney (19S6b) found a negative tradeoff 
between defense and other government expenditures for one set of 
countries and a positive tradeoff for another group of countries. The 
positive tradeoff was explained as a result of either civilian governments 
allocating more to defense to keep themselves in power, or because large 
capital outlays in the military were immune to short-term cutbacks. 
Harris, Kelly and Pranowo (1988) tested for a tradeoff between 
defense and education or health. The results for 1983 suggested that 
high defense expenditures did not mean concomitant low health/education 
expenditures. In addition, defense, health and education are all 
vulnerable during overall cuts in government expenditures. In times of 
government expansion, defense and education expand at a comparative 
• 
96 LOONEY & FREDERIKSEN 
rate in low income countries. In middle income countries, health 
expands relatively more than defense and education. 
Using data for 1982 and 1983, Hess and Mullman (1988) examined 
the determinants of defense and also the tradeoff between defense and 
education. They found no substitution between the military and public 
education. De Masi and Lorie (1989) examined tradeoffs when the 
budgets expand and also contract under IF-supported programs in 
developing countries. Under fiscal-tightening the proportion of defense 
expenditures to GDP decreased, but defense expenditures to total 
government expenditures increased. Under fiscal accommodation by the 
IMF, resources allocated to defense declined as total expenditures grew. 
Examining 51 countries between 1975 and 1987, Hewitt (1991) 
concluded that central government expenditures as a proportion of GDP 
rose to accommodate increases in interest costs. However. defense and 
economic services were cut by 23 % and 17 % respectively. Harris and 
Kusi (1992) found that defense expenditures in the African countries 
involved with the IMF stabilization programs were relatively more 
vulnerable than in those countries not in the stabilization program. 
A recent examination of Saudi Arabian budgetary priorities 
(Looney, 1992) found that defense expenditures are very complementary 
to human resource allocations including health. The major tradeoffs 
involving defense were concentrated in transportation and communication 
and economic resource development. An examination of budgetary 
tradeoffs in Pakistan (Frederiksen & Looney, 1995) suggested economic 
services were adversely affected by defense spending and overall 
government debt. However they were not affected by the government's 
budgetary deficit position. 
It thus appears that governments consider a wide range of factors 
--including political and economic costs, present versus future 
consumption and the potential impact on employment and welfare-- when 
faced with reducing public expenditures. Across-the-board reductions in 
expenditures seem to be rare for developing countries facing austerity 
programs. More often than not, capital expenditures are reduced more 
than current expenditures. Social and admini_strative/ defense sectors 
seem to be well protected while infrastructure and similar programs 
absorb disproportional larger reductions. 
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BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS -- EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The four commonly used measures of relative defense effort 
defense as a share of (a) Gross National Product (GNP) and (b) central 
government expenditures, (c) armed forces per capita, and (d) arms 
imports as a percentage of total imports is useful as a way to roughly 
divide developing countries into two broad groups of high and low 
defense spenders. However the classification is all too often ambiguous: 
some countries may indicate low defense shares of GNP on the one hand 
but large allocations of the central budget on the other hand. As recently 
indicated (Frederiksen & Looney, forthcoming) a factor analysis (using 
data from 1972 to 1989) incorporating these four variables and twenty-
one other related variables provided an unambiguous ranking of countries 
in terms of defense patterns. A discriminant analysis confirmed the 
correct classification of countries of countries into either the high or low 
defense group. This recent study indicated Egypt, Syria, Jordan, 
Morocco, Pakistan and Israel were relatively highly militarized, and Iran, 
Malta, Oman, Tunisia, Cyprus, and Bahrain relatively less militarized. 
To examine changes in various government programs in the face of 
budgetary changes or changes in defense, the following model was 
estimated in linear form: 
SHAREi, 1 = aDFTEX1 + bDFTUN + cMILUN1 + dMILEX1 + E (1) 






to the ith program in year t, 
is the expected government deficit or surplus, 
is the unexpected (transitory) deficit or surplus, 
is the unexpected expenditures, 
is expected defense expenditures, and 
is the error term with the traditional statistical assumptions. 
All variables are expressed as a share of the central government 
expenditures. Expected values of the deficit and military variable in time 
period tis based on the trend of past levels. Unexpected values are the 
difference between actual and expected values. The military variable is 
included to represent the guns versus butter analogy. While the SHARE 
variable might be influenced by resources allocated to programs other 
than defense, the military budget is usually the most significant variable 
affecting sector allocations. 
98 LOONEY & FREDERIKSEN 
Equation ( 1) assumes that the expected deficit reflects a structural 
imbalance between revenues and expenditures. Transitory deficits (the 
component of the deficit not anticipated) may occur because of a revenue 
shortfall. In this case the expected deficit could be met by cutting 
expenditures accordingly. If an unanticipated deficit occurs, we assume 
this reflects a decision to fund priority sectors. If a program's share falls 
as the unanticipated deficit increases, we assume this reflects a decision 
to support programs with a higher priority. This form of prioritizing is 
consistent with some form of lexicographic ordering of budgetary 
priorities where the government tries to maintain certain pre-defined 
levels. As these levels are met, authorities are willing to increase 
funding for categories and programs of lower priority. The expected and 
unexpected military expenditure terms can be interpreted in a similar 
manner. 
We present detailed results for two representative countries: Syria, 
a high defense country, and for Oman, a low defense country. Ol Each 
country exhibits many of the patterns found in other member countries 
of their respective group. Two sets of the model were estimated for each 
country: Equation (1) was estimated to reflect short-run budgetary 
adjustments to changes in the deficit and defense expenditures. A second 
set of equations were estimated by including the lagged value of the 
dependent variable (LAG) as an additional independent variable. This 
form examines the long-run budgetary adjustments to year-to-year 
changes in the deficit position and military shares. The longer term 
adjustments were assumed to follow a distributed lag function (Koyck, 
1954). 
The results of the short-run impact model and longer run adjustment 
model for Syria appear as Table 1. In the short-run, the results suggest 
that the Syrian government tends to use budget deficits as a means of 
tempering the impact of expanded defense programs on social programs. 
Rising defense expenditures (both expected and unexpected) and 
budgetary deficits expand to increase the provision of public services, 
housing and community activities. To varying degrees the budgetary 
shares of these categories are stabilized throuih expanded fiscal deficits. 
On the other hand, the defense expenditure stimulus to health and 
education is dampened by the overall budgetary effect. 
TABLE 1 






Social Security, Welfare 
Housing, Community Activities 




Public Services 5.34*** 
Education 0.93 
Health 5.43*** 
Social Security, Welfare 4.87*** 
Housing, Community Activities 5.60*** 
Mining, Manufacturing, Coastruction 2.80** 
Short Run Impacts 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DFI'EX DFI'UN MIL UN 
-4.25*** -5.45*** 
6.00*** 4.70*** 
3.41 *** 2.79** 2.73** 
-8.01 *** -8.00*** 
-4.66*** -2.43** 
1.88* 2.17* -4.35*** 
-2.86** -3.85*** 
-1.38 -2.49** 
Long Run Adjustments 
DFI'EX DFI'UN MIL UN 




- 3.30*** - 0.94 
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Economic services present more of a mixed pattern. Increases in 
defense occur at the expense of (a) mining, manufacturing, and 
construction, (b) energy, and (c) transportation and communication. The 
resulting decline in budgetary shares is reinforced through the fiscal 
deficit. On the other hand, the Syrian government appears willing to run 
higher deficits for the purpose of stabilizing allocations to energy and 
transportation/ communication. 
Many of these patterns appear similar, but weaker, in the longer 
term. While defense budgetary shares expand at the expense of social 
security, housing community amenities and economic services, only in 
the case of social security and housing does the government seem willing 
to expand the deficit to maintain programs. In the long-run, increased 
education and health expenditures expand with defense. While the 
government continues to use budget deficits to offset this effect on 
education, health appears unaffected by movements in the fiscal deficit. 
The results for Oman, a member of the low defense group, appear 
as Table 2. Many of the patterns apparent in Syria seem to be reversed. 
For example, in the short-run, increased defense usually comes at the 
expense of ''SOcial services such as education, health and housing. 
However, expanded defense shares tend to be associated with expanded 
allocations to economic activities. such as mining, manufacturing, 
construction and communication. In contrast to Syria, the Oman 
government appears to confine its use of deficits to housing, mining, 
manufacturing and construction in order to offset these defense impacts. 
In the longer run, defense expenditures do not affect health or 
education expenditures with the former being supported by larger 
deficits. Allocations to housing appear vulnerable in the long-run to 
expanded defense shares. This effect is reinforced through budgetary 
cuts during times of expanded deficits. Economic services appear 
complementary to defense expenditures. For roads, this pattern is 
reinforced through expanded allocations which, in tum, are associated 
with growing fiscal deficits. 
TABLE 2 
Oman, Short Run Impacts and Longer Run Adjustments, 1972-1989, t-statistics 
Short Run Impacts 
-
SECTOR DFTEX DFTUN MIL UN MIL EX Rz DW 
Education - 0.57 -1.58 -1.86* .91 2.2 
Health -1.40 -3.30*** -2.65** .79 2.6 
Housing, Community Activities -2.47** -3.43*** -1.64 .72 1.9 
Mining, Manufacturing, Construction -2.38** -3.49*** 2.05* 2.87** .39 2.5 
Communications -0.99 1.89* 3.57*** .53 2.2 
Other Expenditures 0.74 -2.78** -3.60*** .72 1.6 
Long Run Adjustments 
LAG DFTEX MIL UN MIL EX Rz 
Education 9.60*** 0.16 -0.24 0.26 .89 
Health 4.43*** -3.79*** 0.64 1.08 .88 
Housing, Community Activities 3.81 *** 3.69*** -4.25*** -2.56** .78 
Economic Services 2.69** -1.63 0.90 3.41 *** .65 
Roads 3.89*** -2.53** 0.96 1.58 .48 
Communications 5.03*** 0.85 -0.31 2.99** .54 
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PATTERNS OF SHORT AND LONG RUN IMPACTS 
While we have only presented results for Syria and Oman, we can 
summarize the patterns of (a) short-run and (b) long-run budgetary 
impacts for both the high defense and low defense groups with respect 
to the different expenditure sectors. Because of the diversity of the 
sample group, not surprisingly no consistent pattern emerges. In the 
short-run, public services seem to have a fairly high priority in only the 
high defense group. For all of the high defense group except Israel, 
increases in the expected deficit funded expanded levels of public 
services. Expanded defense shares (especially unanticipated increases) 
support public services in this group. Public services in the low defense 
group (with the exception of Malta) are not affected one way or another 
with changing deficit or defense shares. 
Education presents an interesting contrast. In the high defense 
group, education allocations increase with expanded expected defense 
shares, although several countries reduce the share to education with 
unexpected increases in defense -- a pattern duplicated in the low defense 
group. Health expenditures seems to be the major casualty of expected 
deficits in the high defense group although in several cases this is offset 
by increased defense expenditures .. Health does not suffer in the low 
defense group as a result of budgetary strategies but is an area likely to 
be cut by increases in defense. 
Housing and community activities receive considerable budgetary 
support in both groups, especially in the case of unexpected deficits in 
the low defense group. Budget shares in housing suffer by changes in 
defense but with no appreciable difference between the groups. 
Economic services provide interesting contrasts since allocations are 
invariably cut as defense expands in the high defense group. However, 
several countries, for example Israel and Pakistan, increase economic 
services as the deficit increases although this effect may be offset by 
changes in the defense share and unexpected deficits. Economic services 
do considerably better in the low defense group, with many countries 
expanding this sector as deficits or milita!Y expenditures increase . 
• 
Roughly the same patten emerges over the long-run. Public 
services benefit from increased deficits in many of the countries in both 
groups. The concomitant expansion with military expenditures in the 
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short-run does not carry over into the long-run however. The negative 
impacts on health in the low defense group from increases in military 
expenditures largely disappears in the long-run. They still occur in 
Pakistan and several of the low defense countries. 
Social security and welfare programs seems to be more vulnerable 
in the long-run to budget cuts in the high defense group. Increases in the 
unintended defense spending reduces allocations to these programs. 
Economic services still appear vulnerable to unexpected increases in 
military spending in the high defense group. However, several of the 
low defense countries no longer expand economic services with increases 
in the deficit. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are four main findings of this study. First, defense budgetary 
tradeoffs for our sample set of countries (and we suspect for all Third 
World countries) are complex, reflecting different priorities across 
countries. Reinforcing this is that increases in deficits can either offset 
or reinforce the defense impacts. Second, defense and socio-economic 
tradeoffs vary considerably, depending primarily on whether the country 
is a high or low defense spender. 
Third, several of the high defense countries appear to cut economic 
expenditures to free up resources for further expansions in the military. 
The high political costs involved in cutting the military share may explain 
this phenomenon. With several exceptions, the low defense spending 
group seem to have a little more flexibility in accommodating increased 
levels of military expenditures. Perhaps as a result economic programs 
are not as susceptible to cuts in these countries. 
Fourth, there are probably long-run costs associated with the 
manner in which our sample group alters budgetary shares to 
accommodate larger defense budgets. While larger defense budgets in 
the high defense group may have helped economic growth in earlier 
decades, the emerging evidence in the literature indicates that the impact 
will be negative in the 1980s and 1990s and may well indicate a neglect 
of economic services, infrastructure programs and the like. However, 
given the lagged nature of defense impacts, a reorientation of budgetary 
-----------~----- -
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priorities may be reflected in economic growth for at least another 
decade. 
NOTES 
1. Results for the entire sample group of countries can be 
obtained from the authors on request. 
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